diff options
author | Simon Howard | 2014-04-01 20:43:45 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Simon Howard | 2014-04-01 20:43:45 -0400 |
commit | 8eb3200286d523379295143ce3f44d77ce036d4b (patch) | |
tree | ac0edb56027f285425d896e12a1b14d78ad294b9 /src/doom/hu_stuff.c | |
parent | 565a1f08566520147a5abff5744dbcc256e5030c (diff) | |
download | chocolate-doom-8eb3200286d523379295143ce3f44d77ce036d4b.tar.gz chocolate-doom-8eb3200286d523379295143ce3f44d77ce036d4b.tar.bz2 chocolate-doom-8eb3200286d523379295143ce3f44d77ce036d4b.zip |
Replace all snprintf() calls with M_snprintf().
The Windows API has an _snprintf function that is not the same as
Unix's snprintf(): if the string is truncated then no trailing NUL
character is appended. This makes the function unsafe. Define a
replacement/wrapper called M_snprintf that works the same but always
appends a trailing NUL, for safety on Windows and other OSes that
behave like this.
Do the same thing for vsnprintf(), and update HACKING to list
snprintf/vsnprintf as forbidden functions. This fixes #375;
thanks to Quasar for pointing out the different behavior of these
functions.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/doom/hu_stuff.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/doom/hu_stuff.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/doom/hu_stuff.c b/src/doom/hu_stuff.c index 8ea3912e..dd72e63f 100644 --- a/src/doom/hu_stuff.c +++ b/src/doom/hu_stuff.c @@ -627,8 +627,8 @@ boolean HU_Responder(event_t *ev) // static unsigned char buf[20]; // DEBUG HU_queueChatChar(c); - // snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "KEY: %d => %d", ev->data1, c); - // plr->message = buf; + // M_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "KEY: %d => %d", ev->data1, c); + // plr->message = buf; } if (c == KEY_ENTER) { |